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Abstract: Until recently, teacher employ-
ment and pay across the United States 
was strictly determined by education and 
experience, even though research shows 
that teachers with similar credentials and 
experience vary widely in their ability to 
influence student outcomes. As a result, 
there has been a surge in interest nation-
ally in “pay-for-performance” contracts 
that tie pay to various measures of perfor-
mance. Critics of pay-for-performance, 
often including teacher unions, raise 
concerns about incentives to narrow 
curricula (aka “teaching to the test”) and 
adverse effects on teacher collaboration, 
among others. 
Minnesota’s Q Comp is one of the 
nation’s largest and longest-lasting pay-for-
performance programs; it delivers reform 
via a voluntary “grantor-grantee” format 
that ensures political feasibility. Districts 
design alternative contracts with their 
unions, then propose them to the state for 
extra funding. We studied the effect that 
adoption of Q Comp in Minnesota districts 
had on student achievement growth and 
found program adoption leads to an 
additional month’s worth of learning, on 
average, in reading scores. Similar gains 
were observed in math scores, but with less 
statistical precision. We found no notable 
evidence of student or teacher movements 
in response to the program, nor any signifi-
cant evidence of “teaching to the test.” We 
concluded that the program increased test 
scores by providing incumbent teachers 
with the incentives and tools to adjust 
their practices in ways that increase test 
scores. Gains were obtained at relatively 
low cost, so the program is cost effec-
tive. However, the size of the gain was 
not sufficiently large for such voluntary 
pay-for-performance to be relied on as the 
only tool for improving education quality. 
A well-designed “grantor-grantee” type 
pay-for-performance program can be a 
valuable tool in policymaker’s arsenals, for 
improving education quality. 
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Adoption of Minnesota’s pay-for-performance teaching bonus program Q Comp leads to an additional month’s worth of 
learning, on average, in reading scores.
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In the United States, teacher contracts have long mandated that compensa-tion and other personnel decisions be 
either strictly or heavily based on teacher 
education and experience. This “steps 
and lanes” approach references the 
two-dimensional salary schedule at the 
heart of most teacher contracts. Recent 
research highlights that teacher effec-
tiveness (typically measured through 
student outcomes) varies substantially 
even within cohorts of teachers of 
similar education and experience. This 
finding has led to a surge in the design 
and implementation of policies that 
tie teacher compensation and other 
personnel decisions to factors other than 
education and experience. 
Minnesota’s Q Comp is one of the 
nation’s largest and longest-lasting 
programs to, in part, implement depar-
tures from traditional teacher contracts. 
We studied the performance of the 
program with the hope of understanding 
whether or not the reforms implemented 
through Q Comp helped increase 
student test scores. (Note: We studied 
the effects on test scores because they are 
readily available, quantitative, and have 
unambiguously desirable outcomes. We 
do not mean to suggest that standard-
ized test scores are the only relevant 
output of an educational system.)
Background and Significance
Minnesota has a rich history of educa-
tional reform, and efforts to introduce 
changes to teacher contracts predate Q 
Comp. Significant state-wide changes 
started to appear in the early 2000s. 
Legislative change in 2002 made it 
possible for districts, in collaboration 
with teacher unions, to design pilot 
compensation programs that augmented 
the steps and lanes approach and made 
use of alternative measures of perfor-
mance. Importantly, these reforms 
were implemented through a “grantor-
grantee” mechanism. The grantor (in 
this case, the state) set parameters for 
what is considered acceptable reform, 
and the grantees (the districts) designed 
plans that fit within the scope of the 
program in exchange for extra funds. 
Five districts applied to be part of this 
early reform effort, and in 2003 they 
started participating in the program, 
which offered an annual increase of 
$150 per student in funding. The funds 
were offered in return for adopting 
some elements of what would eventu-
ally become Q Comp. Additionally, in 
2004, all schools in the Waseca district 
and three Minneapolis schools started 
participating in the Milken Foundation’s 
Teacher Advancement Program (TAP).
Q Comp became law in 2005 with 
bipartisan support. It maintains the 
grantor-grantee structure of the 2003 
pilot and some of the definitions of 
“performance,” but it also draws heavily 
on TAP for defining what reforms are 
acceptable and how to measure perfor-
mance. Under Q Comp, districts are 
invited to design reforms that satisfy 
certain criteria in exchange for $260 
in additional funding per student each 
year. Because the criteria that Q Comp–
eligible contracts need to satisfy were, 
to a large extent, inspired by those used 
in TAP, sites that were participating in 
TAP were automatically enrolled into Q 
Comp, while the five districts partici-
pating in the 2003 pilot were given the 
option to modify their contracts to meet 
Q Comp requirements or to continue 
with their existing programs and receive 
$150 per year, until 2009 (instead of 
$260). 
Once Q Comp was taken to scale, 
traditional public school districts 
and charter schools state-wide began 
applying to the program. In its first offi-
cial year, 2005, nine districts applied to 
Q Comp; all adopted. In 2006, 38 more 
districts applied, of which 29 adopted 
and 9 failed to adopt. Of all 361 districts 
in the state in 2006, 42 were partici-
pating in Q Comp, 9 were rejected, and 
310 had not applied. This second year 
of the official program had the largest 
application and adoption cohorts. By 
2009, the final year of our achievement 
data, 56 districts (16%) were partici-
pating, 20 (5%) had previously applied 
but were not participating, and 281 
(79%) had never applied. 
Q Comp has several attributes that 
make it an interesting policy experi-
ment. First, the program is voluntary 
(districts chose to apply) and somewhat 
selective (the state could choose not to 
fund proposals). Q Comp was adopted 
by a sizable number of districts, over 
multiple years, while some districts 
were rejected. This structure allows us to 
separate the impact of the program itself 
from other possible explanations (gener-
ally a difficult thing to achieve without 
an experimental design). For instance, 
consider a case where all districts adopt 
in the same year. It would be impossible 
to determine if any change in test scores 
was because of the program or because 
of something else that happened in the 
same year to encourage applications to 
Q Comp. Also, because some districts 
that wanted to join the program were 
unable to do so, we could rule out the 
possibility that it is the intent of an 
ambitious administration to “shake 
things up” that matters and not the 
reforms that come with Q Comp. 
Second, the program is large and was 
implemented as a permanent (or at least 
long-lasting) regime. This is important, 
because it may take time for teachers to 
adjust to the new incentives and take 
advantage of the professional devel-
opment opportunities. Experiments 
are generally considered superior to 
secondary data analysis for dealing with 
confounding factors in program evalu-
ation, but because they are short-lived, 
they trail large policy experiments such 
as Q Comp in terms of external validity 
and generalizability. 
Also, as noted, the program follows 
a grantor-grantee structure, where 
the district (grantee) first comes up 
with a proposal that has the support 
of the administration and teachers 
(represented by the union) and then 
proposes it to the Minnesota Depart-
ment of Education (grantor), which, 
in turn, ensures that the proposal is 
within required reform parameters. 
This structure ensures that reform is 
both feasible and that it adheres to the 
intent of the legislation that made it 
possible in the first place. It is perhaps 
due to these desirable features that this 
grantor-grantee format is now used by 
large federal programs, such as the $1.6-
billion Teacher Incentive Fund and the 
$4.4-billion Race to the Top program. 
Q Comp presents the first opportu-
nity to evaluate an instance of such 
an approach to teacher labor market 
reform. 
The state mandated that, in their 
applications, districts specify the 
bonuses each teacher is eligible to earn 
for three types of criteria: 
1. the formal classroom-observation 
process;
2. school- or district-wide goals for stu-
dent achievement usually on stan-
dardized tests;
3. quantifiable goals negotiated within 
the school (between administration 
and teachers) for student achieve-
ment defined at the teacher, team, or 
grade level but not usually based on 
standardized tests.
For classroom observations, the 
state encouraged districts to use the 
Danielson Framework for Teaching, 
the most widely used evaluation rubric 
nationally, and to conduct at least three 
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observations per year using a trained 
evaluator and with pre- and post-
observation conferences. Teachers are 
rated on measures of planning and prep-
aration, classroom environment, profes-
sional responsibility, and instructional 
practice. Depending on the district, the 
evaluator is the principal or another 
administrator, a peer, or a hired consul-
tant (e.g., senior teacher from other 
districts or retired teacher).
Bonuses for school- or district-wide 
goals tied to standardized tests would be 
based on specific objectives laid out in 
the initial Q Comp application, and/or 
updated in annual reports to the Minne-
sota Department of Education (MDE) 
prior to the start of each school year. 
These are awarded to all teachers in the 
school/district if the goals are met, and 
to no teachers otherwise. 
Individual teacher or small team 
bonuses were typically linked to goals 
that were set and measured in the 
context of a complementary manage-
ment practice, which MDE refers to as 
“job embedded professional develop-
ment.” Specifically, with the support 
of their administration, teachers form 
professional learning communities. 
Here, teachers collaborate on selecting 
performance targets that form the basis 
for Q Comp’s individual or small-group 
bonuses and help each other achieve 
those targets. They meet regularly to 
analyze classroom practice, to learn new 
instructional strategies and tactics, to 
field-test them in the classroom, and to 
report the results to each other. 
Across Q Comp districts, the average 
bonus available to teachers tied to each 
of these criteria was $1,107, $243, and 
$850 per year, respectively. Classroom 
observations had the most stakes tied 
to them. School-wide goals based on 
standardized achievement tests had the 
least. 
There was a lot of variation around 
these averages. Figure 1 shows the wide 
variety of programs adopted; the size of 
the dot indicates the total amount each 
teacher was eligible to earn, the share 
tied to teacher or grade-level goals is 
along the x axis, and the share tied to 
school- or district-wide goals is along 
the y axis. The distance from the fron-
tier measures the amount tied to the 
formal observation cycle. For example, 
the small dot at the origin represents a 
district that offered a bonus of between 
$1,000 and $2,000, none of which was 
tied to teacher or grade-level goals, or 
to school- or district-wide goals, thus 
all of it was tied to formal observations. 
Alternatively, the large dot in the middle 
of the frontier represents a district that 
offered a bonus of more than $4,000, 
half of which was tied to teacher or 
grade-level goals, half of which was tied 
to school- or district-wide goals, and 
none of which was tied to formal obser-
vations. The key point is that districts 
that adopted Q Comp came up with a 
large variety of contract designs.
Questions
We attempted to answer two questions:
1. Did Q Comp adoption cause 
growth on student test scores that 
would not have been realized in its 
absence? Increasing student achieve-
ment is the primary purpose of most 
recent reforms, so Q Comp’s impact 
on the path of student test scores is a 
question of primary interest.
2. What were the mechanisms that 
produced the gains? Q Comp is 
a large change and could operate 
through several channels. We exam-
ined if changes in test scores were 
explained by: 
(a) adopting districts attracting bet-
ter students, 
(b) adopting districts simply getting 
extra money,
(c) adopting districts attracting dif-
ferent kinds of teachers, 
(d) incumbent teachers in adopting 
districts changing practices, or
(e) assessment-specific gains (often 
indicative of what is referred to 
as “teaching to the test”).
The answer to the second question is 
important because the different chan-
nels have very different implications. If 
adopters experienced better outcomes 
because the program attracted better 
students (option a), then there is no 
average gain across all students, just 
a reshuffling, with the potential for 
widening achievement gaps and little/
no overall gain. Next, adopting districts 
got extra money, and that fact alone 
could bring about positive change 
(option b). If the additional dollars 
explained the effect, the implication 
would be that it is not necessary to 
design elaborate labor-market reform to 
achieve gains, just increase budgets. 
Figure 1. Variety of Pay-for-performance Bonuses Offered by Q Comp Districts
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Clearly, explanation d whereby the 
reform provides incumbent teachers 
with the tools and incentives needed 
to change their practices in a way 
that achieves higher test scores, is the 
state’s best-case scenario. Explanation c 
might be equally desirable to the state, 
but only under certain circumstances. 
Explanation c works through differential 
selection of different types of workers 
into teaching positions. Presumably, 
individuals who are able to thrive in a 
high-stakes environment will be more 
likely to be drawn to teaching positions 
that have some performance stakes 
attached. Explanations c and d may be 
equally desirable from an overall policy 
perspective, depending on whether the 
“differential selection” is into the State’s 
teaching force, or a mere reshuffling of 
existing teachers across the Q Comp and 
non Q Comp schools. To the central 
authority (MDE in this case), it may not 
matter if scores increased because of 
differential selection into the teaching 
force or if the reform gave incumbent 
teachers the tools and incentives to 
approach their jobs differently. 
If explanation e is at play, in prac-
tice, one would expect the program 
to initially reshuffle existing teachers. 
However, with growing coverage and 
tenure of Q Comp, all differential selec-
tion would eventually have to occur 
into the teaching force. In other words, 
pay-for-performance regimes, such as 
Q Comp, would have to become an 
expected, non-trivial, and widespread 
component of teacher pay in order to be 
reflected in the occupational decisions 
of young college students. 
Explanation e underscores one of 
the most frequent objections to teacher 
labor reform that ties personnel deci-
sions to student test scores. The idea 
is that, in order to increase test scores, 
teachers may either narrow the curric-
ulum to focus heavily or explicitly 
on topics and skills that are directly 
tested and/or spend time teaching 
test-taking skills/techniques rather 
than substance. If the curriculum were 
narrowed, observed gains in test scores 
would represent an actual increase in 
knowledge, but at an unknown cost 
to other skill/knowledge that is not 
directly tested. This can, to some extent, 
be mediated by designing better tests. 
Effort put into merely improving test-
taking skill rather than subject-matter 
knowledge, on the other hand, gener-
ates relatively unproductive test score 
gains. 
Methods and Results
To answer each question, we used the 
test score history of all Minnesota 
students in grades 3 through 8 at any 
point between 2003 and 2010. This 
includes full student histories of Minne-
sota Comprehensive Assessments (MCA) 
reading and math scores, as well as full 
student histories of Northwest Evalua-
tion Association’s (NWEA) Measures of 
Academic Progress (MAP) when avail-
able. 
The use of two separate assessments 
is important because they complement 
each other well. The MCA is used by 
all districts, but it is also high stakes for 
teachers and administrators in ways that 
are not related to Q Comp. Since this 
is the metric that is generally used for 
accountability to the state and under 
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Gains that districts had in standardized test scores after implementing Q Comp do not seem to be connected with teachers 
“teaching to the test.”
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the No Child Left Behind Act, schools 
already may have strong incentives 
to raise MCA scores and it could be 
subject to “teaching to the test” and 
other less-than-productive practices 
(explanation e). MAP is available only 
in districts that purchase it, so it does 
not have the widespread coverage that 
the MCA does, but it is used only as a 
diagnostic tool, so it is inherently a low-
stakes assessment and more reliable in 
that sense. 
To answer the first question of 
“Did Q Comp adoption cause growth 
on student test scores that would not 
have been realized in its absence?” we 
then compared the test score histories 
of students whose districts adopted Q 
Comp at some point after the student 
took his or her first test, to the histories 
of similar students but whose districts 
never adopted Q Comp, and then to the 
test score histories of students whose 
districts attempted to adopt Q Comp 
but were unable to do so. 
One of the most important concerns 
with evaluation of programs like Q 
Comp, that are voluntary, is that those 
districts that chose Q Comp are not 
randomly chosen. They made a delib-
erate effort to adopt a novel labor 
reform system. Such districts that are 
willing to put effort into reform, and 
able to successfully collaborate with 
their teachers (represented by the 
union) to design and implement this 
reform have demonstrated inclinations 
and capabilities that may not be present 
in other districts. Adopting districts 
may also be taking other measures to 
improve their scores, and Q Comp may 
only be a part of their overall improve-
ment plan. If this were the case, it could 
be easy to mistakenly attribute higher 
growth in these districts, that may be 
due to a variety of factors, to Q Comp 
alone. 
To rule out this possibility, we 
compared data on Q Comp and non Q 
Comp districts before and after adop-
tion of Q Comp. For our evidence to 
be reliably interpreted as a Q Comp 
effect, we would have to find that Q 
Comp districts do not start to look any 
different from all other districts in the 
state until after they adopt the program.
Figure 2 presents highly reliable 
evidence that Q Comp caused higher 
test score growth in districts that 
adopted it. To produce Figure 2, regres-
sion techniques have been used to 
re-align student test score data for all 
students in the state in such a way that 
sets the year-to-year growth of all non Q 
Comp districts to zero, thus representing 
it on the horizontal axis. Test scores 
for Q Comp and non Q Comp districts 
are also fixed to be the same (and set 
to zero) on the last year prior to adop-
tion. Differences in test score growth 
patterns between Q Comp districts and 
the rest of the state are then represented 
by the dots for each year, before and 
after adoption of Q Comp. Year 0 is 
the adoption year, negative numbers 
indicate years prior to adoption, and 
positive numbers indicate years into the 
program. 
There are three plausible scenarios 
related to the effects of Q Comp: (A) 
districts that chose Q Comp were similar 
to those that didn’t, but Q Comp had 
no effect; (B) districts that chose Q 
Comp were already making other efforts 
to improve, so growth in these districts 
is really a continuation of pre-existing 
overall effort, not due to Q Comp per 
se. This scenario is often mistakenly 
interpreted as a program effect if one 
is not careful to look at relative growth 
in test scores before and after adop-
tion; (C) districts that chose Q Comp 
were similar to those that didn’t, but 
once they adopt they experience higher 
growth (most likely due to Q Comp). 
This scenario can be reliably interpreted 
as evidence of a Q Comp effect. 
Under scenario A, the graph would 
show dots that overlap the horizontal 
axis throughout. Under scenario B the 
Figure 2. Differences Between Districts Adopting Q Comp and the State as a Whole 
by Year Relative to Adoption (Reading Scores)
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dots would form a line that approaches 
the horizontal axis from below, crosses it 
at “–1” and continues to grow at about 
the same rate in post-adoption years. 
Our actual results (Figure 2) show that 
before adopting Q Comp, those districts 
that end up adopting look no different 
than the rest of the state, on average. 
The lines around the dots in Figure 2 
represent statistical bounds that reflect 
margins of error. Only in cases when the 
line does not cross the horizontal axis 
are we reasonably certain that Q Comp 
districts are performing differently than 
the rest of the state. Figure 2 shows 
that this is nearly always the case after 
adoption, and never the case before. 
We thus conclude that the program did 
make a difference in increasing reading 
scores in adopting districts. We found 
the average size of the effect to be about 
one month’s worth of typical student 
learning. 
We also found results that look rela-
tively similar in Math, but the statistical 
margins of error were higher, so we are 
not able to interpret those as conclusive 
evidence of a Q Comp effect. 
In terms of mechanisms, the 
evidence suggests that the program 
brought about reform that changed 
the practice of incumbent teachers. We 
use data on student demographics and 
expenditures by districts each year to 
rule out the possibility that the effect 
that we observe in Figure 2 is driven 
by movements of students in pursuit 
of, or away from Q Comp districts, or 
that the effect is simply explained by 
the fact that Q Comp comes with an 
additional $260 per pupil each year. 
We also include teacher flows between 
districts in our analysis to test whether 
Q Comp changed the composition of 
participating districts’ teaching force in 
any way. We do not find evidence that 
Q Comp caused differential movements 
in teachers by experience or education 
levels, thus we conclude that teacher 
selection into Q Comp districts was not 
a factor in explaining the result. 
Additionally, districts that use both 
assessments MCA and NWEA-MAP were 
able to choose to tie their incentives 
to either assessment in either subject 
(Math or Reading). We performed 
additional tests to see if districts 
experienced disproportionally high 
gains only on the incentivized test, 
rather than in the incentivized subject 
(across both assessments) and found 
no evidence of such. This implies that 
there is no evidence of less/unproduc-
tive practices, such as “teaching to 
the test.” We concluded that Q Comp 
had its impact primarily by changing 
incumbent teachers’ practices, resources 
and incentives.
How does Q Comp change 
teachers’ actions? Q Comp introduced 
incentives to pay closer attention to 
measureable outcomes but also the 
capacity to do so in practice. Teachers 
were given more time to consult with 
peers within professional learning 
communities and increased feedback 
by both administrators (in high-
stakes observations) and colleagues 
(in low-stakes observations). While it 
is apparent that the program changed 
teaching practices, it is less obvious 
which particular part of Q Comp 
was most important, or even if the 
multiple components of the overall 
reform package can work separately. 
Because the program encouraged the 
introduction of reform as a bundle, it 
was impossible to evaluate the relative 
merits of the different kinds of incen-
tives and the various reform elements. 
Conclusions 
Our study showed with high reliability 
that the implementation of Q Comp 
had a positive effect on student test 
scores, at least in reading. Two points 
about Q Comp are noteworthy:
The effect is relatively small, so one 
cannot rely on Q Comp as the sole tool 
for making substantial improvements 
in test scores or substantial reductions 
(or eliminations) in achievement gaps 
across student populations. 
The program was highly cost-
effective. To put this in perspective, 
the cost of educating one student in 
Minnesota over nine months is around 
$10,000. So, to obtain the growth 
caused by Q Comp by simply adding 
resources to schools (even if we were to 
ignore the practical problems of adding 
one month to the school year), the 
cost would still be more than $1,000. Q 
Comp gets the same result with $260. 
Thus, efforts that would reallocate Q 
Comp’s revenue to general funds and do 
1. Pay for performance: The state encouraged districts to tie bonuses to indi-
vidual/small-team goals, school- or district-wide goals, and each teacher’s for-
mal classroom obse rvations. Districts varied in the amount allocated to each of 
these.
2. Classroom observations: The state encouraged districts to model their formal 
observations on Charlotte Danielson’s Framework for Teaching. Observation 
cycles included pre- and postobservation conferences. All observations were done 
by trained evaluators, often a school administrator.
3. Job-embedded professional development: The state encouraged districts to 
reform professional development using the model of professional learning com-
munities, which provide time to devote analysis of student data, peer observa-
tion, and coaching.
4. Career ladders: The state encouraged districts to provide teachers with 
opportunities for taking different career roles and accelerating their 
advancement, through mentoring, involvement in program design and 
leadership roles.
5. Alternative compensation: The state asked each district to make a commit-
ment to move away from basing pay increases on longevity and coursework. 
This component was often the most vague as details were left to future  
labor-management negotiations.
We attempted to disentangle these components (and even the impact of the various 
bonuses within the pay-for-performance component). In the end, there was no clear 
story about which component, or combination of components, was most impor-
tant. The results reported here treat Q Comp as a single reform that encompasses 
different combinations of the five components in each of the adopting districts.
Q Comp’s Five Components
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away with the program’s structure are 
likely ineffective. 
Overall, we believe that Q Comp is 
an important tool in education policy in 
Minnesota. One of the shortcomings of 
the study was that it could not pinpoint 
the relative importance of the different 
types of incentives and the various 
reform elements. However, because Q 
Comp’s framework is sufficiently flexible 
and able to incorporate diverse reforms 
into contracts, in politically feasible 
ways, we suggest that it can be used to 
deliberately pilot candidate interven-
tions for future study.
This study also sheds new light on 
various matters of importance to educa-
tion policy in general. Designing labor 
market reform for teachers is a very 
complex task, from both a theoretical 
perspective and in terms of practical 
application and political feasibility. 
We believe that the “grantor-grantee” 
format used by Q Comp overcomes 
many difficulties, but does impose some 
limits. For instance, one of the most 
important objections to pay for perfor-
mance based on student test scores is 
the possibility that teachers will teach 
to the test or, as has sometimes been 
the case (e.g., in documented incidents 
in Chicago and Atlanta), intentionally 
manipulate test scores. One possible 
method to mediate this would be to 
attach bonuses not only to test scores, 
but also to peer and/or principal obser-
vations of teachers’ in-classroom prac-
tice. Observations, on the other hand, 
come with added subjectivity; the need 
for observers raises questions of reli-
ability across observers. The optimal mix 
of objective and subjective components 
of evaluation is not obvious, and can 
vary based on setting. 
Another issue relates to an inherent 
tradeoff between strength of incentives 
and collaborative work. Economists 
believe that tournament-style competi-
tions for bonuses, where agents compete 
for set prizes, are able to deliver the 
strongest incentives. However, if collab-
oration among teachers is important to 
productivity, tournament-style incen-
tives or individual bonuses could prove 
unproductive by limiting incentives to 
collaborate. A solution to this might be 
to offer group bonuses to meaningful 
teams of teachers. Group bonuses, 
however, introduce a “commons” 
problem, in that the likelihood of a 
bonus depends less on a teachers’ own 
efforts, and more on those of others; the 
larger the group, the weaker the added 
incentive for each teacher. The optimal 
mix of individual and group bonuses, 
size of group, whether collaboration is 
meaningful within teachers of the same 
grade, subject or both are also questions 
that do not have easy answers. Teachers 
of the same subject can collaborate on 
techniques or content development, but 
teachers of the same group of students 
can synchronize curricula (e.g., to 
make sure that the math teacher covers 
content needed to make progress in 
science class). 
The “grantor-grantee” model has 
a central authority (state or federal 
funder) that sets some boundaries on 
the types of reforms that are accept-
able, but ultimately delegates the design 
details on the desired mix of stakes 
tied to standardized test scores, other 
student outcomes, or in-class observa-
tions of teacher practices to the district. 
The district also chooses the extent 
to which individual or group bonuses 
are awarded, and choses how to deter-
mine group sizes and settings. Because 
districts are likely to have far better 
information on their own settings than 
a central designer (at a state or federal 
agency), they might be able to make 
choices that work better for them. In 
Minnesota, for example, some of the 
bonuses were operationalized through 
the Professional Learning Community 
structure, which was part of profes-
sional development practice in many 
districts statewide. Local design also 
ensures political feasibility, which is not 
to be taken for granted for a centrally 
designed reform package. 
Local design, however does have 
its drawbacks. Local authorities may be 
able to design incentives and set targets 
that are not as challenging as they 
would be under central design, making 
sure that more teachers get the bonus. 
This would weaken incentives. This is 
where the grantor can play a role, by 
setting reform parameters that make it 
less likely for local designers to propose 
weaker incentive schemes, and by over-
seeing implementation and updating 
of reform packages from the viewpoint 
of an advocate of a strong incentive 
system.
Our study showed that Q Comp gave 
Minnesota districts an opportunity to 
design reform packages and districts did, 
in fact, choose a wide variety of designs. 
With all things considered, the wide-
spread adoption of the program and 
impact on test scores, shows that the 
policy design is capable of producing 
a positive cost-effective net effect on 
achievement. 
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